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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
BRENT E. BLANK, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
— 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 — 
Case No. 950219-CA 
Priority No. 2 
— 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 — 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over appeals from Circuit Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(d) (1990). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The applicable statute to this appeal is Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953, as 
amended), and is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Has defendant waived his claim that the court erred in omitting the parties' 
proposed jury instructions? 
2. Did the omitted instructions result in manifest injustice? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rulings on issues of law are reviewed under a "correction of error" standard. 
City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 518 (Utah) cert, denied, 111 S.Ct. 120 
(1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol on August 9, 
1994. A jury trial on this charge was held on January 24, 1995, before the Honorable 
Edward A. Watson. 
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After both parties rested their respective cases, the court distributed proposed 
jury instructions to the parties. Neither party objected to any of the instructions. The 
court subsequently read them to the jury. 
The jury found defendant guilty of driving while intoxicated, and he was sen-
tenced on February 24, 1995. 
Defendant now claims the court erred by failing to use the prosecutor's proposed 
actual physical control instruction and defendant's proposed public intoxication and 
intent instructions. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 9, 1994, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Sergeant Catlin of the Utah 
Highway Patrol was patrolling near 3500 South and 2700 West, in West Valley City, 
when he saw a red Toyota Celica parked at a strip mall on the north side of 3500 South 
(Trial Transcript at 12) (hereinafter "T"). The car's headlights were on and defendant, 
the only occupant, was slumped to the right of the steering wheel (T. 11,12, 20). Being 
concerned about defendant's welfare, Sergeant Catlin stopped to investigate (T.13). 
He tapped several times on defendant's window without receiving any response (T.13). 
Sergeant Catlin then opened defendant's door and shook defendant several times 
before he woke up (T.15). 
The sergeant asked defendant to turn off the car radio. Instead, he grabbed the 
air vent knob and attempted to turn it (T.16). Defendant eventually found the radio and 
turned it down (T.16). Sergeant Catlin then reached into the car and pulled the car key 
out of the ignition (T.15). 
When defendant turned toward Sergeant Catlin's to tell him he was okay, the 
sergeant could see defendant's eyes were glassy and bloodshot and his face flushed 
(T.17). Defendant's speech was slurred, and he had an odor of alcohol on his breath 
(T.17). He admitted he had been drinking at a friend's and was on his way home 
(T.18). 
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After Sergeant Catlin asked for his registration and driver's license, defendant 
stepped out of his car and retrieved his wallet from his pocket and opened it up (T.17). 
Although the sergeant could see his driver's license, defendant continued to look for it 
(T.17). During his search, defendant lost his balance and fell backward into the driver's 
seat and then stood up again (T.17). 
Sergeant Catlin then called Trooper McMorris to come and investigate defendant 
for driving under the influence of alcohol (T.20,21). The sergeant could not continue 
the investigation himself because he needed to remain free to respond to any major 
incident in the county since he was the only sergeant on duty (T.20). 
Trooper McMorris found the same physical characteristics for defendant as Ser-
geant Catlin had observed (T.65). He administered five field sobriety tests to defen-
dant: (1) the horizontal gaze nystagmus; (2) one-leg stand; (3) walk and turn; (4) 
alphabet; and (5) ten count (T.51-64). Defendant failed all of the tests except for the 
ten count (T.51-64). 
Based upon defendant's physical characteristics and performance on the field 
sobriety tests, Trooper McMorris arrested defendant for driving while intoxicated (T.64, 
65). Trooper McMorris then read the DUI Admonition to defendant, who agreed to take 
a chemical test (T.66). But when they arrived to where the intoxilyzer was located, 
defendant refused to take the test (T.67). 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court instructed the jury on the law (T. 
102). Neither party objected to the jury instructions. The jury subsequently convicted 
defendant of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The general rule is that before a party can claim a trial court erred by omitting 
particular jury instructions, the party must properly object at trial. The objection must be 
both timely and specific. Defendant made no objection to the court's instructions. 
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The only exception to this rule is whether the instructions resulted in a manifest 
injustice. However, in this case, the instructions did result in manifest injustice. The 
court's actual physical control instruction generally covered the subject matter and was 
similar to the one the defendant claims he wanted the court to use. 
Defendant's public intoxication and intent instructions did not apply to the subject 
matter of this case. Driving while intoxicated is not the greater offense of public intoxi-
cation and does not require proof of a mental state. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HIS CLAIM THAT THE COURT ERRED BY 
OMITTING THE PARTIES' INSTRUCTIONS 
Generally, "[n]o party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the 
matter to which he objects and the grounds for his objection." U.R.Cr.P. 19(c); State v. 
Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987). The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized 
that Rule 19(c) requires a timely, specific objection at trial to the instructions. State v. 
Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 594 (Utah 1988). Where no grounds are apparent from the text 
of the instruction and no objection is stated, the objection is presumed waived. State v. 
Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1986). 
In the instant case, both the prosecutor and defense counsel submitted pro-
posed jury instructions to the court prior to trial. At the conclusion of the evidence, the 
court instructed the jury on the law. Missing from the court's instructions was the 
prosecutor's proposed actual physical control instruction.1 Also missing were defen-
dant's public intoxication and intent instructions. But defendant never objected to the 
court's instructions. Therefore, by failing to object, he cannot claim that the trial court 
erred by failing to include these instructions. 
1
 Defendant claims the prosecutor submitted the instruction he has identified as Appendix D in his brief. 
However, the prosecutor submitted the instruction attached hereto as Addendum B. 
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Defense counsel may claim that he did object when he stated "[a]nd the way I 
hope to remedy that is to take exceptions to the jury instructions that relate to that 
issue" (T.100). However, this was not a proper objection for two reasons. First, 
defense counsel's comment was made even before the court gave the parties its jury 
instructions and was a general objection. The supreme court has clearly stated that 
Rule 19(c) requires timely, specific objections to jury instructions. Medina, 738 P.2d at 
1023. Defense counsel's comment fails to meet the fundamental requirements of Rule 
19(c) and the case law. 
Second, defense counsel's statement was made in response to the court's ruling 
that defendant's refusal to take the chemical test could be used against him despite not 
being given Miranda before being requested to take the test, and Sergeant Catlin had 
the legal right to stop and speak with defendant (T.89-100). It was not made in 
response to the court omitting any instructions. 
Moreover, defense counsel never submitted his own actual physical control 
instruction. He claims the court should have used what he claims was the prosecutor's 
instruction attached to his brief as Appendix D. How could defendant take exception to 
an omitted jury instruction he did not submit? The Utah Supreme Court answered this 
question in State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984), by holding that it is not 
error to omit a particular jury instruction that has not been specifically requested. 
II. COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT RESULT IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE 
Even though defense counsel failed to properly object, Rule 19(c) provides that 
error may be assigned to the instructions to avoid "manifest injustice." U.R.Cr.P. 19(c). 
The term "manifest injustice" in most circumstances is synonymous with the "plan error" 
standard. State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1994). The noting of errors in 
jury instructions is done rarely and cautiously. State v. Evans, 668 P.2d 566, 568 
(Utah 1983). 
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A. Court's Actual Physical Control Instruction Generally Covered the 
Subject Matter. 
In Shabata, the court observed that it is not error to omit an instruction not spe-
cifically requested when the instructions the court gave generally covered the subject 
matter. Id. at 790. 
In this case, the court's instruction stated, in part: 
'Actual Physical Control' is defined in its ordinary sense to mean, 'existing 
or present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation.' It 
is not limited to the act of driving. A person is also in 'actual physical con-
trol' of a vehicle if he is in the driver's position behind the steering wheel, 
with possession of the key and with the apparent ability to start and move 
the vehicle. 
This instruction generally covered the subject matter of actual physical control for pur-
poses of section 41-6-44. It provides a broad definition of what actual physical control 
can be and several of the factors which a jury can consider in making it decision. It is 
not a misstatement of the law and does not limit the circumstances a jury can consider, 
including whether defendant was found asleep or awake. 
Moreover, the court's instruction is substantially similar to the one defendant 
wanted it to use, in what it does and does not contain. It contains no language about 
the car's occupant being asleep or awake, but contains the same factors. How can 
defendant claim harm when there was no foul committed in this case? 
Defendant relies upon Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990) 
and Rogers v. State, 773 P.2d 1226 (Nev. 1989) for his claim that sleep is of prime 
importance when considering the issue of actual physical control. However, defendant 
misstates the law. Sleep is just one of many factors a jury can consider; it is not the 
determinative factor. Richfield City, 790 P.2d at 93. Richfield City held that what is 
to be considered is the totality of the circumstances when determining the issue of 
actual physical control. Id. 
For defendant to claim error, based on the single factor of sleep, is illogical. He 
ignores the broad language of the definition the court gave, a definition to simply guide 
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the jury in their deliberations. While perhaps not the most artful or well-written instruc-
tion, it was certainly adequate. 
Defendant also ignores the totality of the circumstances in which he was found. 
Sergeant Catlin testified that he found defendant, the sole occupant, slumped to the 
right of the wheel. The car keys were in the ignition and the headlights as well as the 
radio were on. Defendant admitted he had been driving home from work. The 
evidence that defendant was in actual physical control was overwhelming, whether 
Sergeant Catlin found him awake or asleep. 
Defendant further ignores the fact that the instruction did not preclude defense 
counsel from arguing the sleep factor in his closing argument and from the jury con-
sidering it. 
B. Public Intoxication is not the Lesser Included Offense of Driving 
While Intoxicated. 
The rule is that a lesser offense is included in a greater one when the proof of 
the greater offense would necessarily include proof of all the elements necessary to 
prove the lesser offense. But when proof of a lesser offense requires some element not 
necessarily involved in the greater offense, then the claimed lesser offense would not 
necessarily be an offense included in the greater one. State v. Gandee, 587 P.2d 
1064, 1066 (Utah 1978). 
Public intoxication is not the lessor included offense of driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol. Proof of the elements of driving under the influence does not prove all 
of the elements of public intoxication. 
Section 41-6-44(1 )(a) reads: 
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after 
the alleged operation or physical control; or 
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(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the per-
son incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
In contrast, Section 76-9-701(1) provides: 
A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor, a controlled substance, or any substance having he property of 
releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the person may endanger himself 
or another, in a public place or in a private place where he unreasonably 
disturbs other persons. 
Driving while intoxicated does not require proof that a defendant is intoxicated to 
the point that he or she is a danger to himself or another in a public place or in a private 
place where he unreasonably disturbs other persons. The only similarity is that both 
offenses can involve alcohol or drugs. 
Because public intoxication is not a lesser included offense, defendant's instruc-
tion did not apply to this case. The court properly excluded it. 
C. Driving under the Influence is a Strict Liability Crime 
Although Utah has yet to addressed the issue, other courts interpreting similar 
legislation to Utah's have held that driving under the influence as a strict liability 
offense, especially where the crime is defined solely in terms of driving with a blood 
alcohol level in excess of a defined percentage. State v. McDole, 734 P.2d 683, 686 
(Mont. 1987) (Driving under the influence is an absolute liability offense not requiring 
the proof of a mental state by the State"); State v. Harrison, 846 P.2d 1082 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1992) ("[W]e hold that the offense of DWI is a strict liability crime"); See also, 
People v. Thomson, 496 P.2d. 304 (III. App. Ct. 1986); Burns v. State, 556 N.E.2d 
955 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); City of Defiance v. Kretz, 573 N.E.2d 32 (Ohio 1991). 
According to a leading DUI expert, 
Drunk driving legislation is intended to prohibit drunken operation 'under 
any and all circumstances.' The act of driving a vehicle under the influ-
ence of alcohol or drugs, or both is 'itself the crime.' The state is not 
required to show 'any particular mental state' except that the driver was 
'under such influence.' If intent were an element of the offense, situations 
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could arise in which defendants could not be convicted under the statute 
because they were too intoxicated to form the requisite intent. The para-
doxical and absurd result would be that the more intoxicated the driver 
became the better his chances of avoiding liability under the statute. 
Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases, § 1.05 (1989). 
Because driving under the influence is a strict liability offense, the state was not 
required to prove defendant's mental state. It does not matter what your state of mind 
is, a person cannot drive a car while impaired. Requiring proof of intent would reward 
those who are the most intoxicated, an absurd result which would undermine the very 
purpose of the DUI laws in removing dangerous drivers from the road. The court cor-
rectly omitted defendant's intent instructions from its instructions. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant failed to object at trial to the instructions the court omitted. He there-
fore has no claim that the court erred in omitting the parties' proposed instructions. 
Nor does he have a claim that the instructions resulted in manifest error. 
Although the court's actual physical control instruction did not refer to the factor of 
sleep, it generally covered the subject matter of actual physical control and was similar 
to the one defendant wanted the court to use. It did not preclude defendant's counsel 
from arguing this factor and the jury considering it. 
However, the court did properly preclude defendant's public intoxication and 
intent instructions. Neither applied to the subject matter of the case - driving while 
intoxicated. Public intoxication is not a lesser included offense and driving while intoxi-
cated is a strict liability crime. 
Based upon the foregoing, the state requests this court to deny defendant's 
appeal and affirm his conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
DATED this day of December, 1995. 
CY H. CASTLE 
Deputy District Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Cy H. Castle, hereby certify that eight (8) copies of the above Brief of Appellee 
will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, #300, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84111; and further, that four (4) copies of the same will be delivered to Robert 
Macri, Attorney for Appellant, 211 East 300 South, #209, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, on 
this day of December, 1995. 
CY H. CASTLE 
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ADDENDUM A 
9i-6-41. Utah Criminal 
(1) All written reports required in this article to be 
forwarded to the department by operators or owners 
of vehicles involved in accidents or by garages are 
without prejudice to the reporting individual and are 
for the confidential use of the department or other 
state agencies having use for the records for accident 
prevention purposes. However, the department may 
disclose the identity of a person involved in an acc-
ident when the identity is not otherwise known or 
when the person denies his presence at the accident. 
The department shall disclose whether any person or 
vehicle involved in an accident reported under this 
section was covered by a vehicle insurance policy, 
and the name of the insurer. 
(2) Written reports forwarded under this section 
may not be used as evidence in any trial, civil or 
criminal, arising out of an accident, except that the 
department shall furnish upon demand of any party 
to the trial or upon demand of any court a certifi-
cate showing that a specified accident report has or 
has not been made to the department in compliance 
with law, and if the report has been made, the date, 
time, and location of the accident, the names and 
addresses of the drivers, the owners of the vehicles 
involved, and the investigating officers. The reports 
may be used as evidence when necessary to prose-
cute charges filed in connection with a violation of 
Subsection (3). 
(3) A person who gives information in oral or 
written reports as required in this chapter knowing 
or having reason to believe that the information is 
false is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. i9S7 
41-6-41. Statistical information regarding 
accidents - Annual publication. 
The department shall tabulate and may analyze all 
accident reports and shall publish annually, or at 
more frequent intervals, related statistical informa-
tion as to the number and circumstances of traffic 
accidents. 1987 
41-6-42. Local powers to require report. 
A local authority may by ordinance require that 
the operator of a vehicle involved in any accident, 
or the owner of the vehicle, also file with the desi-
gnated municipal department a written report of the 
accident or a copy of any report required under this 
article to be filed with the department on accidents 
occurring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for 
the confidential use of the municipal department 
and are subject to Section 41 -6-40. i9Si 
Article 5. Driving While Intoxicated and 
Reckless Driving. 
41-6-43. Local OUI and related ordinances and reckless 
driving ordinances - Consistent with code. 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, 
or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration 
— Measurement of blood or breath alcohol -
Criminal punishment - Arrest without warrant -
Penalties - Suspension or revocation of license -
Penalties. 
41-644.1. Procedures - Adjudicative proceedings. 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol 
or drug - Number of tests - Refusal -
Warning, report - Hearing, revocation of license -
Appeal - Person incapable of refusal - Results of 
test available - Who may give test - Evidence. 
41-644.20. Drinking alcoholic beverage and open 
containers in motor vehicle prohibited - Definitions • 
• Exceptions. 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis -
Evidence. 
41-644.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by 
peace officers — Impound requirements - Removal 
& Traffic Code • UT*&SS 
of vehicle by owner. 
41-6-44.4. Person under 21 may not operate vehicle with 
detectable alcohol in body - Chemical test procedures 
- Temporary license - Hearing and decision -
Suspension of license or operating privilege - Fees • 
• Judicial review. 
41-644.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in 
actions for driving under the influence - Weight of 
evidence. 
41-644.6. Definitions - Driving with any measurable 
controlled substance in the body - Penalties -
Arrest without warrant. 
41-6-44.7. Ignition interlock devices - Use -
Probationer to pay cost - Impecunlositv - Fee. 
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for specified offenses may 
prosecute for certain DUI offenses and driving while 
license is suspended or revoked. 
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty. 
41-6-43. Local DUI and related ordinances and 
reckless driving ordinances - Consistent with 
code. 
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority 
that governs a person's operating or being in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having 
alcohol in the blood or while under the influence of 
alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug, or that governs, in relation to 
any of those matters, the use of a chemical test or 
chemical tests, or evidentiary presumptions, or 
penalties, or that governs any combination of those 
matters, shall be consistent with the provisions in 
this code which govern those matters. 
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority 
that governs reckless driving, or operating a vehicle 
in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of 
persons or property shall be consistent with the 
provisions of this code which govern those matters. 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol 
concentration - Measurement of blood or 
breath alcohol - Criminal punishment -
Arrest without warrant - Penalties -
Suspension or revocation of license -
Penalties. 
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the 
person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test 
given within two hours after the alleged operation or 
physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating 
this section is or has been legally entitled to use 
alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge 
of violating this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of 
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall 
be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time 
of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another 
as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle 
in a negligent manner; or 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the 
# Utan i minai c* iraiiK L,oue 4% m-p-^. 
vehicle at the time of the offense. I 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is 
that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that 
degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and 
prudent person exercises under like or similar circ-
umstances. 
(c) In this section, a reference to this section inc-
ludes any similar local ordinance adopted in comp-
liance with Section 41 -6-43. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court 
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours 
nor more than 240 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, 
require the person to work in a community-service 
work program for not less than 24 hours nor more 
than 50 hours. 
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or commu-
nity-service work program, the court shall order 
the person to participate in an assessment and edu-
cational series at a licensed alcohol or drug depen- I 
dency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, 
the court may order the person to obtain treatment 
at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility determines that the person has 
a problem condition involving alcohol or drugs. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation 
committed within six years of a prior violation 
under this section the court shall as part of any 
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not 
less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 720 
hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, 
require the person to work in a community-service 
work program for not less than 80 hours nor more 
than 240 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to participate in an assessment and educati-
onal series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. The court 
may, in its discretion, order the person to obtain 
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehab-
ilitation facility. 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation commi-
tted within six years of two prior violations under 
this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in 
Subsections (ii) and (7); and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior 
convictions are for violations committed after April 
23,1990. 
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as 
part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail sent-
ence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160 
hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, 
require the person to work in a community-service 
work program for not less than 240 nor more than 
720 hours. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate 
(c) (i) Under Subsection (aX») the court shall as 
part of any sentence impose a fine of not less than 
$1,000 and impose a mandatory jail sentence of not 
less than 720 hours nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, 
require the person to work in a community-service 
work program for not less than 240 nor more than 
720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on 
the record the reason it finds the defendant should 
not serve the jail sentence. Enrollment in and com-
pletion of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilit-
ation program approved by the court may be a 
sentencing alternative to incarceration or community 
service if the program provides intensive care or 
inpatient treatment and long-term closely superv-
ised follow through after the treatment. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of the prior 
violations under this section is a third degree felony 
if at least three prior convictions are for violations 
committed after April 23 ,1990 . 
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose 
a fine of not less than $1,000 and impose a mand-
atory jail sentence of not less than 720 hours nor 
more than 2,160 hours. 
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, 
require the person to work in a community-service 
work program for not less than 240 nor more than 
720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on 
the record the reason it finds the defendant should 
not serve the jail sentence. 
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation program approved 
by the court may be a sentencing alternative to inc-
arceration or community service if the program 
provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and 
long-term closely supervised follow through after 
the treatment. 
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence 
required under this section may not be suspended 
and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this 
section has been served. Probation or parole resul-
! ting from a conviction for a violation under this 
I section may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license 
suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction 
under this section, until the convicted person has 
furnished evidence satisfactory to the department 
that: 
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency asses-
sment, education, treatment, and rehabilitation 
ordered for a violation committed after July 1, 
1993, have been completed; 
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution 
and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person 
have been paid, if the conviction is a second or 
subsequent conviction for a violation committed 
within six years of a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive 
or illegal manner as certified by a licensed alcohol 
or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, if the 
conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction 
for a violation committed within six years of two 
prior violations committed after July 1,1993. 
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), 
(6), and (7) that require a sentencing court to order 
a convicted person to: participate in an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
I dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the 
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discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, 
mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug depe-
ndency rehabilitation facility; or do any combina-
tion of those things, apply to a conviction for a 
violation of Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a 
prior conviction under Subsection (10). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regar-
ding education or treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, or both, in con-
nection with a first, second, or subsequent convic-
tion under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a 
prior conviction under Subsection (10), as the court 
would render in connection with applying respecti-
vely, the first, second, or subsequent conviction 
requirements of Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conv-
iction under Section 41-6-45 that qualified as a 
prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a first, 
second, or subsequent conviction under this subse-
ction, a previous conviction under either this section 
or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prior convic-
tion. 
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
program and any community-based or other edu-
cation program provided for in this section shall be 
approved by the Department of Human Services. 
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea 
of guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of 
Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substi-
tute for, an original charge of a violation of this 
section, the prosecution shall state for the record a 
factual basis for the plea, including whether or not 
there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a 
combination of both, by the defendant in connec-
tion with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts 
that shows whether there was consumption of 
alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before 
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of 
the consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-
45 as follows. 
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea of 
guilty or no contest to a charge of violating Section 
41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for the record 
that there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a 
combination of both, by the defendant in connec-
tion with the violation, the resulting conviction is a 
prior conviction for the purposes of Subsections (5), 
(6), and (7). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each 
conviction of Section 41-6-45 that is a prior 
offense for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and 
(7). 
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, 
arrest a person for a violation of this section when 
the officer has probable cause to believe the viola-
tion has occurred, although not in his presence, and 
if the officer has probable cause to believe that the 
violation was committed by the person. 
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a 
person convicted for the first time under Subsection 
(l);and 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person 
convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsec-
tion (1) if the violation is committed within a period 
of six years from the date of the prior violation. 
(b) The department shall subtract from any sus-
pension or revocation period the number of days for 
which a license was previously suspended under 
Section 53-3-223, if the previous suspension was 
based on the same occurrence upon which the 
record of conviction is based. 1994 
41-6-44.1. Procedures - Adjudicative 
proceedings. 
The Department of Public Safety shall comply 
with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its adjudicative proceedings. I9t7 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for 
alcohol or drug - Number of tests ~ 
Refusal - Warning, report - Hearing, 
revocation of license - Appeal - Person 
incapable of refusal - Results of test available 
- Who may give test - Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this 
state is considered to have given his consent to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine 
for the purpose of determining whether he was 
operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-
44 or 41-6-44.4, while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and 
any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having 
any measurable controlled substance or metabolite 
of a controlled substance in the person's body in 
violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or 
tests are administered at the direction of a peace 
officer having grounds to believe that person to 
have been operating or in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 
41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or while under the infl-
uence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of 
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or 
while having any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's 
body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the 
tests are administered and how many of them are 
administered. 
(ii) If an officer requests more than one test, 
refusal by a person to take one or more requested 
tests, even though he does submit to any other req-
uested test or tests, is a refusal under this section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this 
section to submit to a chemical test or tests of his 
breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test or 
tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to 
arrange for any specific chemical test is not a 
defense to taking a test requested by a peace officer, 
and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or 
administrative proceeding resulting from a person's 
refusal to submit to the requested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, 
has then been requested by a peace officer to submit 
to any one or more of the chemical tests under 
Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chem-
ical test requested, the person shall be warned by the 
peace officer requesting the test or tests that a 
refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in 
revocation of the person's license to operate a 
motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (a), if 
the person docs not immediately request that the 
chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer 
be administered a peace officer shall serve on the 
person, on behalf of the Driver License Division, 
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immediate notice of the Driver License Division's 
intention to revoke the person's privilege or license 
to operate a motor vehicle. When the officer serves 
the immediate notice on behalf of the Driver License 
Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if 
any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 
days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved 
by the Driver License Division, basic information 
regarding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver 
License Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if 
approved as to form by the Driver License Division, 
serve also as the temporary license. 
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed report, 
within five days after the date of the arrest, that he 
had grounds to believe the arrested person had been 
operating or was in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 
41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, while under the influence 
of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and 
any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having 
any measurable controlled substance or metabolite 
of a controlled substance in the person's body in 
violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that the 
person had refused to submit to a chemical test or 
tests under Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the 
Driver License Division's intention to revoke his 
license under this section is entitled to a hearing. 
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in 
writing within ten days after the date of the arrest. 
(iii) Upon written request, the division shall grant 
to the person an opportunity to be heard within 29 
days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a timely written 
request for a hearing before the division, his privi-
lege to operate a motor vehicle in the state is 
revoked beginning on the 30th day after the date of 
arrest for a period of: 
(A) one year unless Subsection (B) applies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous 
license sanction after July 1, 1993, under this 
section, Section 41-6-44.4, 41-6-44.6, or 53-3-
223, or a conviction after July 1, 1993, under 
Section 41-6-44. 
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person and 
conducted by the Driver License Division, the 
hearing shall be documented and shall cover the 
issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds 
to believe that a person was operating a motor 
vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44, 41-6-
44.4, or 44-6-44.6; and 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the 
test. 
(g) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division 
or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpo-
enas for the attendance of witnesses and the prod-
uction of relevant books and papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of 
necessary peace officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage 
from the Transportation F i n d in accordance with 
the rates established in Section 21-5-4. 
(h) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division 
determines that the person was requested to submit 
to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to 
the test or tests, or if the person fails to appear 
before the Driver License Division as required in the 
notice, the Driver License Division shall revoke his 
license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah 
beginning on the date the hearing is held for a 
period of: 
(i) (A) one year unless Subsection (B) applies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous 
license sanction after July 1, 1993, under this 
section, Section 53-3-223, 41-6-44.4, or 41-6-
44.6, or a conviction after July 1, 1993, under 
Section 41-6-44. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess 
against the person, in addition to any fee imposed 
under Subsection 53-3-205(14), a fee under 
Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid before the 
person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover 
administrative costs. 
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person 
obtains an unappealed court decision following a 
proceeding allowed under this subsection that the 
revocation was improper. 
(i) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked 
by the Driver License Division under this section 
may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative 
proceeding is a trial. Venue is in the district court in 
the county in which the person resides. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in 
any other condition rendering him incapable of 
refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is 
considered to not have withdrawn the consent pro-
vided for in Subsection (1), and the test or tests may 
be administered whether the person has been arre-
sted or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was 
tested, the results of the test or tests shall be made 
available to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical 
nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-
30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may 
withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug 
content. This limitation does not apply to taking a 
urine or breath specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical 
nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-
30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a 
sample of blood from any person whom a peace 
officer has reason to believe is driving in violation 
of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at 
which the sample is drawn, is immune from any 
civil or criminal liability arising from drawing the 
sample, if the test is administered according to sta-
ndard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own 
expense, have a physician of his own choice admi-
nister a chemical test in addition to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additi-
onal test does not affect admissibility of the results 
of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace 
officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be 
taken at the direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the 
test or tests administered at the direction of a peace 
officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to 
submit to a chemical test or tests, the person to be 
tested does not have the right to consult an attorney 
or have an attorney, physician, or other person 
present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that under Utah law an individual violates the provisions of our 
Driving Under the Influence statute if the person is "driving" or "in actual physical 
control" of a vehicle. 
Driving is the every-day definition as you may understand it. It means "to urge 
forward under guidance, compel to go in a particular direction or direct the course of." 
"Actual physical control" in its ordinary sense means existing or present bodily 
restraint, directing influence, domination, or regulation. In determining whether the 
defendant was in actual physical control of his vehicle, you may consider, (1) whether 
the defendant was asleep or awake when discovered; (2) the position of the 
automobile; (3) whether the automobile's motor was running; (4) whether the 
defendant was positioned in the driver's seat of the vehicle; (5) whether the defendant 
was the vehicle's sole occupant; (6) whether the defendant had possession of the 
ignition key; (7) the defendant's apparent ability to start and move the vehicle; (8) how 
the car got to where it was found; and (9) whether the defendant drove it there. 
This list of factors is not all-inclusive. In determining whether the defendant was 
in actual physical control, you are to look at the totality of the circumstances since no 
single factor is dispositive of the issue. In order to be in actual physical control, a 
person need not actually move, or attempt to move, the vehicle but only needs to have 
an apparent ability to start and move the vehicle in order to be in actual physical 
control. 
